REDD analysis
REDD Analysis (Dec 2009)
From the perspective of the Ashaninka, TSIMI and Ecotribal
The underlying concept of rewarding forest owners, including indigenous communities, for conserving their forests, rather than destroying them, sounds very simple and in essence highly benign. However, there has been significant criticism of early avoided deforestation initiatives and proposals. With this in mind, Javier, leader of TSIMI - the Ashaninka indigenous bioclimatic association (established in Peru 2008) - wanted to attend the UN Summit Conference (UNFCCC) and parallel events in Copenhagen was to discover what the word was on avoided deforestation initiatives and the development of the REDD initiative.
The REDD concept was introduced to UNFCCC by Papua New Guinea and some other developing countries at the Montreal COP11 in 2005. At the COP15 in Bali the role of REDD included forest conservation, sustainable management and enhancement of carbon stocks. The UN framework for carbon compensation and reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) may not be formally agreed yet, but there are already pioneering experiences which have revealed cracks and faults in implementation. The questions for Javier were - would these problems be the same if REDD (or similar) was tried in his community's rainforest and if any of these issues could be successfully addressed with foresight.
Having attended several workshops in Copenhagen and discussed specific points with a number of experts, the problems associated with REDD initiatives can be summarised into a handful of key issues outlined below. The Ashaninka are in a position to avoid any of these potential pitfalls. Some of the issues, however, need to be addressed at the UN framework level to ensure that the way this programme is structured really does benefit the communities who live in the forest, the biodiversity of the forests concerned and are also associated with genuine emissions reduction rather than "greenwash".
1. PROPERTY (ownership of forest)
There are countries which do not recognize the land rights of indigenous forest people and reports of indigenous communities being cleared out of forest areas to make way for REDD projects led by government or big logging company concessionaries. Land grabbing by corporations is something that communities want to avoid.
REDD projects need to ensure full protection of the rights of indigenous communities by upholding international law .This must be campaigned for within national and international framework development for REDD.
The Ashaninka, however, have clear and strong rights to their community land and have their land titles registered. This was not an issue which will impact on the Ashaninka avoided deforestation projects.
2. RIGHTS (use of forest)
In any REDD project, whether developed by governments, loggers or NGO's, there is a danger that the agreements are written up in a way that impinge of the local community's livelihood by excluding them from utilising the forests in the traditional ways - for food, craft and building materials, medicines, gardening etc.
The Ashaninka insist on full access for traditional forest use, including access for craft goods and family or community building materials. Working in collaboration with Ecotribal and Cool Earth, TSIMI would not permit loss of forest rights in the negotiation and implementation of any avoided deforestation project in their communities.
3. PROFIT (share of carbon market)
Somewhat surprisingly, the issue of profits was rarely discussed in Copenhagen. When the subject emerged, it was dealt with in very general terms, assuming that the governments and big companies would always make a lot of money on the backs of the projects. Everyone seemed to agree that very little would trickle down to the community level.
The Ashaninka do not want to wait around for resources and profits to trickle into their communities. This is clearly a matter for negotiation and a sphere of project development in which the Ashaninka insist on being fully involved.
As landowners and project leaders, TSIMI and the Ashaninka communities insist on transparent and participatory negotiations to determine purchase of the carbon credits embedded in their forests and also rights to a proportion of any future profits made in the carbon marketplace.
4. BIODIVERSITY (negative environmental feedback and its implications for biodiversity of flora and fauna)
As presently structured, the REDD programme also allows large agricultural or forestry companies to transform virgin areas of primary forest into plantations. These companies are powerful and are heavy promoters of REDD. Furthermore, the concept of sustainable management permitted within some categories of REDD projects can involve serious degradation of local biodiversity, particularly when managed by large companies rather than local communities. The UN definition of forest is so loose that when it discusses the "enhancement of forest" it presently allows any area over 500m² with crown cover of 10% and trees capable of growing 2m or more high.
This is a serious flaw in the present REDD framework and needs to be addressed at an international level.
TSIMI and the Cutivireni Ashaninka, however, will always maintain community control over its own forest and resources. Their aim is to enhance the biodiversity of their forests through avoided deforestation. The communities have already experienced an influx of wildlife into their forests when loggers are working close to the perimeter of their territory.
5. KNOCK-ON EFFECT
This is perhaps the weakest of arguments. It suggests that if you avoid deforestation in Area A, it will merely be displaced into Area B, so there is no overall benefit. Although logical, the fact is that logging machinery, at any one moment, is a finite and specific resource. Avoiding deforestation in Area A is still a success and Area B might even follow their neighbour's example. Only by making more loggers can we actually increase their impact on the planet's forests.
The Ashaninka working with TSIMI are quite clear that they would rather conserve than destroy their forests. We wouldn't stop fighting a house fire or defending against a violent aggressor simply because there was a risk it may then target somewhere else. We would be more likely to collaborate with neighbours to resist on a larger scale. In this way, too, the TSIMI project may grow and help other communities to resist or revoke contracts with loggers.
The root cause - economic demand, a matrix of commercial and consumer decisions - is beyond the control of the Ashaninka. The consumption of timber, soya and meat makes up a large part of this demand and it almost entirely emanates from the industrialised and rapidly industrialising nations.
6. CARBON PERMITS (reducing emissions as well as alleviating conscience)
This issue involves the "licence to pollute" and the potential for "greenwash" inherent in offering big polluting companies the chance to continue emitting CO² and other gases simply by buying carbon credits. This problem has nothing to do with the forest itself, but is built into the mechanism and structure of carbon markets.
Javier and TSIMI are quite clear on this point - they would expect the carbon market to work in such a way that it allocated credits from forest carbon stores on to polluters who were trying to reduce its overall emissions. They do not want to encourage companies to maintain or raise pollution levels.
Essentially, this is an issue of market structure. The only influence that TSIMI might have on the market is by negotiating a model agreement with any carbon credit investor, one which incorporated conditions of use.
7. CARBON CALCULATIONS (accuracy and permanence)
The difficulty of measuring precisely the amount of carbon locked into a forest prohibited forests inclusion in the Kyoto Protocol back in 1997. There is also the associated problem of permanence. Who can really guarantee that the forest won't be cut down by someone not party to the agreement? Or, burn down naturally?
This argument is largely already outdated by technical and research advances in the field. A combination of sample field surveys and aerial laser mapping now provides fast and accurate carbon assessment for rainforest areas in Peru.
Permanence is an issue, but one which TSIMI intends to address by structuring any deal into annual economic benefits rather than large single payments.
